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Casenotes
VALIDITY OF AN AREA DESCRIPTION IN A DEED
WHICH PURPORTS TO CONVEY PART
OF A LARGER KNOWN TRACT
McDonough v. Roland Park Co.'
This was a bill in equity to quiet title. In 1849 Jacob
Mason conveyed a 30 acre tract of land to George Smith
with the following reservation: "Reserving therefrom the
graveyard situated upon said above described premises the
same to be fifty feet square and to be used only as a burial
place by the said Jacob Mason and his heirs, with free ingress and egress thereto at all times hereafter by said Jacob
Mason and his heirs."' la Mason died in 1876 and was buried
in Mount Olivet cemetery. By mesne conveyences the property came to plaintiff in 1946. In no instrument in the chain
of title was the graveyard again mentioned. Engineers of
plaintiff made very extensive and exhaustive efforts to
locate the graveyard, but no indication of any grave anywhere on the premises was found. A seventy-seven year
old witness who lived within two blocks of the land all his
life testified that he had heard that a graveyard was supposed to be located upon the land, but that he had never
seen it, and had never heard of anyone ever being buried
there, and that had there been a burial he would have had
knowledge of it. Through newspaper advertising and other
diligent efforts plaintiff located the defendants as the persons claiming to be the heirs of Jacob Mason.
The opinion of the Court, in affirming a decree for the
plaintiff, declared that since it was never established that
the graveyard existed at any time, and there was not a
sufficient description in the reservation to identify the intended graveyard with reasonable certainty, the reservation must be declared inoperative and void. As authority
for the decision they cited the Maryland case of Neel v.
Hughes' and the Arkansas case of Mooney v. CooledgeY
The facts in the former case are in no way analogous to the
facts in the present case except as to an insufficiency of
description of the land conveyed. The deed purported to
57 A. 2d 279 (Md.) (1948).
Ibid, 280.
8 10 Gill & J. 7 (Md.) (1838).
30 Ark. 640 (1875).
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convey all the right, title, and interest which the grantor
had in a named estate in a certain county, and that constituted the only description. The Court there stated, and the
statement was quoted: "Every conveyence must either on
its face, or by words of reference, give to the subject intended to be conveyed, such a description as to identify it.
If it be land, it must be such as to afford a means of locating
it."4 The Arkansas case is more directly in point. There the
deed conveyed 147 acres reserving one acre as a family
burial ground, many family relatives already having been
buried there. The Court held that there was no question of
the intent to convey only 146 acres and reserve the one acre
as a burial plot, but since there was nothing whatever in
the deed to locate the one acre, the reservation must be
declared inoperative. In view of later decisions and the
strengthening factor in this case that the burial ground was
physically located upon the ground, it is certainly difficult
to justify today this early decision of the Arkansas Court.
With regard to land descriptions and the problem involved here, the factual situations can be divided into three
classes: (1) Where the parcel to be conveyed or reserved
is a part of a larger known tract, and the deed designates
the known tract and also designates a specific point located
within the parcel to be conveyed. Such a situation was
involved in the case of Honey v. Gambriel,5 where the
grantor conveyed the south-east quarter of the south-west
quarter of a certain section "except one-half acre where
the graveyard is now situate and a passway from the road
thereto." A small graveyard already had been laid out on
the ground and several persons buried there. The Court
held that where reference is made in a deed to a certain
point, such as graves or the like, for the purpose of identifying the land conveyed or reserved, such point is to be taken
as the common center of the land conveyed or reserved.
In such case the land would be laid off as a square with the
graveyard as near center as possible. This doctrine was
also recognized in Hodge v. Blanton.'
(2) The second type situation is where the parcel to be
conveved or reserved is a part of a larger designated tract,
but there is no description of the conveyed or reserved
narcel, and no known point is designated around which to
locate it. This is the situation involved in the present case.
It is thoroughly discussed in an annotation to the case of
'Supra, n. 2, 10.
'303 I1. 74, 135 N. E. 25 (1922).
'38 Tenn. 560 (1858).
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Turner v. Hunt7 in the American Law Reports, Annotated.'
It is brought out there that according to the majority of
the cases the question of whether the grant or reservation
is operative should be determined by ascertaining the intent of the parties as shown by the language of the instrument construed with' regard to the rule that a conveyence
should be held to pass some interest if such effect may be
given to it consistently with the law and the terms of the
deed. If the intent was to convey a specific portion of the
larger tract, which specific portion was at the time within
the contemplation of the parties, but because of insufficient
description or latent ambiguities the parcel cannot be determined to adequately locate it on the ground, the conveyence or reservation must be held to be inoperative.
But if the grantor intended to convey or reserve, not a
specific tract out of the larger area, but merely a quantity
of acres to be taken from it, the instrument can be held
effective to pass an undivided interest in the whole area
measured by the proportion which the number of acres
conveyed to the grantee bears to the total area of the entire
tract. In the first instance the deed is inoperative because
to allow an undivided interest in the whole tract to pass
would be clearly contrary to the intent of the parties, as
evidenced by the attempt in the description to designate a
specific portion. But in the latter instance, passing of an
undivided interest is logically the intent of the parties. The
case of Turner v. Hunt, and the numerous other cases collected in the annotation clearly establish this theory as
the weight of authority. They further bring out the fact
that often the deed expressly gives the grantee the right to
choose later the particular acres he wants out of the total
tract, and that the right to select may arise by implication
where not directly expressed.9 If not made express or
raised by implication, the grantee's portion can be set off in
proper partition proceedings, just as in the case of any other
tenants in common.
It must not be assumed from this discussion that any
deed purporting to convey or reserve a stated acreage, not
described by a specific description, out of a larger tract
which is described, will in every case pass a proportionate
undivided interest in the larger tract. Such a construction
can only be made where it does not appear to be contrary
to the true intent of the deed. Thus where a void attempt
'131 Tex. 492, 116 S. W. 2d 688 (1938).
s117 A. L. R. 1066, 1071 (1938).
'Ibid, 1086; Smith v. Furbish, 68 N. H. 123, 44 A. 398 (1894).
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is made to reserve or convey a specific portion of a larger
tract, it cannot, because of the absence of sufficient description, be construed to pass an undivided interest.
Under the facts of the present case, it is difficult to discern why it should not fall within this class and be decided
upon this theory. The deed made no attempt to describe
the boundaries of the graveyard, and since it was not physically laid out on the ground at the time, it could hardly
have been a specific portion of the larger tract, the location
of which was within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the conveyence. Therefore, it would not appear to
be contrary to the intent of the parties to construe the
reservation as being of an undivided interest in the thirtyacre tract. It also seems quite plausible to raise by implication from the words of the deed a right in Mason to select
the location on which to situate the graveyard. It may
be possible to justify the Court's decision on some other
grounds, but in view of the support given to this theory by
courts of other states, the argument that the reservation
did not contain a sufficient description seems weak.
(3) The third type situation is where the parcel to be
conveyed is not sufficiently described, and there is no
known point designated within the parcel, and it is not part
of a larger described tract. In such case the conveyence is
clearly void, the proposition being so well established that
it is unnecessary to cite authority to support it. This is the
type situation in which Neel v. Hughes"° falls, in which the
Court made the general statement that every conveyence
must describe the subject sufficiently to identify it in order
to be operative. Apparently the Court in the present case
accepted this general rule without considering the possible
exceptions. A search of the cases discloses no previous
Maryland decision on the precise point as to whether a
conveyence or reservation of an undesignated portion of a
larger designated tract would be operative to pass an undivided interest. It is questionable that the present case
will be taken as authority to hold that it does not, in view
of the well considered authority contra from other jurisdictions, and the fact that the precise problem actually was
not considered in this case. The two early cases mentioned
were the only authority given to justify the Court's decision.
10Supra, n. 2.

